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Abstract 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) in China are distinguished from the IPOs in other 
developed and emerging markets by their extremely high abnormal initial returns and 
so-called Chinese Characteristics. Many policy changes have been made since the 
late 90s in order to regulate and promote the development of the Chinese primary 
stock market. This paper examines the effect on IPO underpricing and short-run 
performance of significant changes in Chinese IPO regulations implemented in May 
2002, based on a sample of 209 Chinese IPOs from 2001 to 2003. The significant 
institutional event was a change in the method of allocating shares through IPO – in 
May 2002 a lottery allocation mechanism was changed in favour of allocation based 
on the market value of investors’ tradable shareholdings. Event study methodology is 
adopted and both parametric and non-parametric tests are performed. The results 
show an average abnormal initial return of 117.48%, which is lower than earlier 
Chinese IPOs but still much higher than IPOs in other markets. More importantly, the 
results reveal that abnormal initial returns decreased by 43.3% after the change in 
regulations, that beta risks of the IPOs increased and that an evenly-upward trend of 
cumulative abnormal initial returns was reversed to become evenly-downward. The 
reform may have influenced both investor demand for IPOs and the behaviour of 
noise traders, while trader reactions may have in turn changed the liquidity of the 
secondary market, affecting the degree of IPO underpricing. The phenomenon is 
consistent with the Information Cascade Hypothesis (Welch 1992) and the 
Bandwagon Hypothesis (Ritter 1998). Further areas for research into the market 
microstructure of the Chinese stock market are suggested, with possible implications 
for policy makers, particularly with respect to decreasing IPO uncertainty (and the 
degree of IPO underpricing), increasing market liquidity and enhancing investor 
confidence. 
 
JEL classification: G14; G28 
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1. Introduction 
Initial public offering (IPO) refers to the first sale of stocks by an unlisted company to 
the public. Stock exchange listing (followed by public trading in open market) allows 
the creation of market prices and liquidity. Information asymmetry and agency 
problems in the market make the valuation of IPOs more difficult than that of listed 
common stocks so an essential part of the IPO process is the discovery of an 
appropriate issue price. IPO pricing must compensate for both direct costs (such as 
underwriting and information disclosure fees) and indirect costs (such as unknown 
risks specific to the offering, as distinct from systemic risks generally involved in 
pricing listed common stocks). The complex and special nature of IPO pricing is 
reflected in an ‘IPO underpricing’ phenomenon, in which statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns are widely observed in the first day of trading.   
The IPO underpricing anomaly is well documented in the literature and has been 
observed almost in every stock market in the world, although the level of abnormal 
initial return varies considerably across countries and over time. The degree of 
underpricing has been found to depend on particular market circumstances (different 
trading mechanisms, market liquidity, regulation status, etc.). For instance, Loughran 
et al. (1994) revealed abnormal initial returns that varied from a low of only 4.2% in 
France (1983-1992) to a high of 80.3% in Malaysia (1980-1991) while Ritter (1998) 
found a higher average level of abnormal initial returns in 13 emerging markets 
(40.8%) than in 20 developed markets (19.6%). In a study of particular interest in the 
context of this paper, for East Asian markets Loughran et al. (1994) found a lower 
average level of underpricing in the 90s than in the 80s that apparently resulted from a 
reduction in regulatory interference. 
Launched in the 80s, established in 1990 and developing during the period of 
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market is distinguished for its Chinese Characteristicsi. Significant uncertainty in the 
process of privatization and economic transition caused severe asymmetric 
information problems in the immature Chinese market. Without exception, empirical 
studies of Chinese IPOs have found extraordinarily high abnormal initial returns. In 
addition, it has been shown that the degree of underpricing is sensitive to the period 
sampled. Thus, Su and Fleisher (1997) documented an abnormal initial return as high 
as 948.59% for 1987 to 1995; Mok and Hui (1998) found lower (but still substantial) 
underpricing of 289% for 1990 to 1993 while Chan et al. (2001) reported underpricing 
of 178% for 1993 to 1998. This may reflect the general (and continuing) regulatory 
and microstructural development of Chinese markets, making for interesting natural 
experiments on the impact of policy reform, particularly with respect to IPO regulation. 
In this paper, we exploit a particular natural experiment created by the IPO allocation 
reform of May 2002 which saw a change in the IPO lottery allocation mechanism.   
We investigate the impact of the reform by comparing underpricing and cumulative 
abnormal returns before and after the change, using event study methodology for 
data from 2001 to 2003. Any change in IPO policy (and the consequent change in 
market microstructure) is likely to alter IPO costs and be reflected in IPO performance. 
This research therefore sheds light on the relationships between IPO costs, IPO 
pricing, market liquidity and market microstructure, with implications for issuers, 
underwriters and policy markers. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical background of this study. Sections 2 and 3 present the data and 
methodology, Section 5 presents results and Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Chinese IPO Regulatory Reform and Theories of IPO Performance 
From 1996 to May 2002, the odds of being allocated IPO shares were determined by 
the amount of money in the subscription. For large investors (generally institutional or 
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the secondary market, the costs of subscribing to IPOs therefore included an 
opportunity cost of cashing in stocks from the secondary market (a trade-off between 
winning the lottery against giving up future gains on existing shareholdings). They 
would therefore have been unlikely to enter an IPO unless convinced that such 
opportunity cost would be covered. After May 2002 the odds and amount of IPO share 
allocation were determined by subscribers’ existing holdings of tradable shares. This 
greatly reduced the costs of subscribing IPOs for large investors, since they were no 
longer required to risk their existing shareholdings in order to increase the chance of 
winning a ‘good’ IPO. On the other hand, speculators who before the reform could 
have used all their funds to chase IPOs in the primary market were ‘punished’ after the 
reform. We should therefore find an impact on market demand for IPOs of changing 
the incentives for different types of investors. In addition, the new regulation may have 
also encouraged continuing investment in the secondary market and thus had a 
positive influence on its liquidity.   
There was, however, considerable debate over this regulation change with dispute 
about its impact on investor demand for IPO. In particular, it was argued that the 
reform was neither of benefit to smaller investors nor motivated institutional investors, 
and hence failed to promote the stability of the market (Hong, 2006).   
Changes in investor demand for IPOs should in the first instance affect IPO pricing, 
with consequent effects on IPO performance. In moving from the primary to the 
secondary market, risky IPO stocks undergo a price discovery process. It is well 
established that this process produces anomalies in IPO performance on the initial 
day of open trading. Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973), Logue (1973) and Ibbotson 
(1975) have all documented significant and systematic increases from offering to 
first-day closing prices in the US market. This underpricing phenomenon appears to 
violate the efficient markets hypothesis, since investors are apparently willing to pay 
much higher prices in the secondary market than in the primary market very shortly 
beforehand while issuers are apparently willing to ‘leave money on the table’.   
 5Since the 1970s, numerous empirical studies have provided international evidence on 
the underpricing anomaly in almost all of the world’s financial markets. Various 
theories have been developed, but no single theory completely resolves the anomaly 
– different theories find supporting evidence: in different markets and different periods, 
and under different microstructural and regulatory conditions.   
Among the various underpricing theories, Welch (1992) and Ritter (1998) have 
respectively proposed ‘informational cascades’ and ‘bandwagon effects’ in stock 
markets. In this approach, less well informed investors make decisions by judging the 
interest of other investors. They subscribe only to IPOs they believe to be popular and 
refuse offerings that they believe other investors do not want (even when other 
favourable information may be available). Welch (1992) demonstrated that demand 
curves can be very elastic in the presence of informational cascades, leading to the 
rapid failure of offerings that are priced too high, even when issuers have favourable 
private information. To avoid failure therefore, issuers underprice their IPOs to attract 
better-informed investors and to induce positive cascades or positive bandwagon 
effects. Any change in IPO regulation could alter the elasticity of market demand for 
IPOs by changing the population of subscribers. In addition, if the market for IPOs is 
subject to competitive pressure then, ceteris paribus, we should expect any simple 
increase in the number of IPO subscribers to lead to a reduction in underpricing. 
It is arguable that Chinese culture and social behaviour since the revolution has been 
more strongly influenced by the perceived desirability of ‘collective action’ than is the 
case elsewhere, and we may conjecture that Chinese markets are therefore 
particularly vulnerable to informational cascades and bandwagon effects. If we accept 
this argument, then it follows that if the IPO regulatory reform of May 2002 gave 
better-informed investors increased opportunities to subscribe to IPOs at the expense 
of less well-informed investors then this should have led to a decrease in the elasticity 
of IPO demand, reducing the risk to issuers of adverse bandwagon effects and IPO 
failure, inducing higher IPO prices and a decrease in underpricing. Of course, the 
same outcome should emerge if the effect of the reform was either to increase the 
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asymmetry constant – increased competition between subscribers and/or higher total 
IPO demand should lead to a higher IPO price (a decrease in underpricing). 
Unfortunately we have no data on the types or numbers of IPO subscribers, so these 
possibilities cannot be disentangled.   
An alternative view arises from the argument given earlier (Hong, 2006), that the 
reform may not only have been of no benefit to smaller investors but may have also 
failed to motivate institutional investors. If Hong is correct, we should expect to see a 
net decrease in IPO demand, leading to a net reduction in the IPO price (an increase 
in underpricing), other things being equal. 
Changes in investor demand for IPOs may also have impact on market microstructure 
through changes in the number and types of traders in the post-issue market. This 
would be consequently reflected in post-IPO price performance. The theory that links 
the market microstructure, IPO pricing and post-IPO performance is not 
well-developed but trader behaviour models of market microstructure may inform our 
predictions of post-IPO performance. For example, De Long et al. (1991) showed that 
noise traders (less well informed investors) can survive in the market and can even 
earn high returns at the expense of informed traders if they can exert pressure on 
prices collectively. Small numbers of noise traders have little power to move prices 
away from fundamental value but an increase in the number of noise traders may 
eventually distort prices. Following De Long et al. (1991), any impact of the 2002 IPO 
reform on the type of traders should be reflected in the price discovery process in the 
secondary market for the IPO stocks (post-IPO performance). Unfortunately, as 
before, we have no way of estimating changes in the classification of traders by type. 
However, if the reform led to a relative increase in general market participation by 
noise traders we might expect, ceteris paribus, a greater degree of both price volatility 
and prolonged abnormal returns in the after-market, while the reverse would be true if 
the reform encouraged greater participation by informed traders. 
 7Data 
The Chinese IPO market is characterised by immaturity and frequent regulatory 
reform. To avoid any confounding effects from other regulation changes, after the 
consideration of various factors the sample period was chosen as 2001 to 2003. 
i.  Since 2001, the Offering Censorate has taken on the role of the CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission) in regulating IPO supply. Recommendations on 
IPOs have been made by investment banks, whereas they were previously made 
by local regulatory authorities.   
ii.  In mid-1999, the fixed pricing method was modified (book-building became 
predominant after 2001).   
iii. After Oct. 2000 the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) was closed to IPOs, leaving 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) as the only IPO market from 2001 to 2003. 
iv.  From 2001 the Chinese stock market turned from bull to bear, maintaining a 
downward trend during 2001-2003, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 (SSE and SZSE 
respectively). 
These considerations suggest that the period 2001-2003 is relatively stable in terms of 
both policy environment (only one regulation change was made, which is the focus of 
this research) and market performance (a consistent trend). 
The data include all A-share IPOs floated on SSE during 2001-2003 – a total of 209 
IPOs. B-share IPOs were excluded both because the A and B markets are segmented 
and because A-shares can be thought to better evince ‘Chinese Characteristics’. 
For each of the 209 IPOs, the offer price was collected from www.cnlist.com while 
daily closing prices for 60 trading days after IPO were collected using software 
provided by www.gw.com.cn. 








The 209 IPOs were divided into two groups, by allocation method. Group I (88 
companies) consists of pre-reform IPOs floated from Jan 2001 to May 2002 (lottery 
allocation odds determined by subscription amount). Group II (121 companies) 
consists of post-reform IPOs floated from Jun 2002 to Dec 2003 (allocation odds 
determined by the market value of tradable shareholdings). The main 
characteristics of the sample are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample – SSE A-shares 
  Group I  Group II 
Time period  Jan 2001-May 2002  Jun 2002-Dec 2003 
IPO pricing method  Book-building pricing  Book-building pricing 




subscription amount.   
Lottery mechanism, 
allocation odds determined 
by tradable shareholdings.
Number of IPOs  88 121 
Source: http://www.cnlist.com 
4. Methodology 
Daily abnormal returns 
Standard event study methodology was used to test for the impact of the regulatory 
change on IPO performance. The event window was 21 days, from the listing day until 
the 20
th trading day. The daily abnormal returns over the event window were 
calculated for the sampled IPOs, using the Market Model (1) to compute the expected 
returns. This allows abnormal returns to be estimated relative to the beta risk of each 
stock. 
it mt i i it R R ε β α + + =                            ( 1 )   11
Market Model employed 
Event window  Estimation window (post-event) 
AR derived  21
st  trading  day    α and β estimated 
Listing day  20
th trading day  60
th trading day 
Because there are no observable trading prices before listing, a post-event window of 
40 trading days (day 21 to day 60) was used as an estimation window for computing 
the alpha and beta parameters. The procedure and chronology of calculating the daily 
abnormal return are illustrated in Figure 3 and explained as follows: 
The actual event window daily return, it R , is defined as  1 / ) 1 ( , − = − t i it it P P R , where 
it P   is the closing price for IPO stock i ( 209 , 1K = i ) on day t (2 0 , 1K = t ). 
Expected daily return (i.e. normal return) over the event window is defined as: 
mt i i t it R X R E β α + = ) (                                ( 2 )  
Here  t X  is conditioning information supplied by the market model on day t,  i α  is a 
constant term for IPO stock i (measuring the part of returns that is independent of the 
market index),  i β  is the systemic risk for stock i and  mt R  is the market return on 
day t, calculated from the Shanghai Stock Exchange A-Share Index.  i α   and  i β  are 
estimated by the market model for the post-event window ( 60 , 21K = t ). 
The daily abnormal return over the event window is defined as: 
) ( t it it it X R E R AR − =               ( 3 )  
 









Aggregation of daily abnormal returns 
Abnormal performance was aggregated for each IPO stock i from day 1 until day T 
(2 0 , 1K = T ). Both cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR) were calculated. The CAR method assumes that a portfolio is 
re-balanced in each period (every day in this case), whereas the BHAR method gives 
the abnormal return from the initial day until the target day (no rebalancing at any 
point). Lyon et al. (1999) have argued that the CAR approach is to be preferred if the 
aim is to measure whether or not the sample persistently earns abnormal returns over 
time. On the other hand, BHAR can precisely measure investor experience. In 
addition, Gompers and Lerner (2003) have suggested that the choice between CAR 
and BHAR largely depends on the trading strategy. Since both methods have their 
own advantages, we calculate both. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for IPO 
stock i over period  ( ) T , 1   is defined as 
() ∑
=
= + + =
T
t
it iT i i AR AR AR T CAR
1
1 , 1 L   ( ) 20 1K = T       ( 4 )  
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i
i II T CAR T CAR    ( ) 20 1K = T  (Group  II,  post-reform)    (6) 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) for IPO stock i over the period  () T , 1  is 
() ( ) ( ) () ∏ ∏
= =
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1 , 1 , 1
i
i II T BHAR T BHAR   ( ) 20 1K = T  (Group  II,  post-reform)    (9)  13
Hypotheses 
The null hypotheses are that the IPO reform had no impact on either IPO underpricing 
or post-listing performance. From our earlier discussion we propose alternative 
underpricing hypotheses: (i) success in stimulating IPO participation, particularly by 
better-informed investors, should lead to a reduction in underpricing and (ii) reduction 
in IPO participation should lead to an increase in underpricing. After-market 
performance is necessarily related to the degree of underpricing, since a reduction 
(increase) in underpricing should be followed by a reduction (increase) in abnormal 
performance. However, the time paths of after-market performance are not as 
predictable. Alternative after-market hypotheses are: (i) a relative increase in market 
participation by better-informed investors should induce quicker and smoother 
adjustment to normal pricing and (ii) that an increase in participation by noise traders 
should lead to prolonged and more volatile abnormal performance. 
Both parametric (two-sample mean-comparison t-test) and non-parametric tests 
(two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test) were performed. 
i. Testing for cumulative abnormal return (CAR)   
0 H :  () T CARI , 1   is not significantly different from  ( ) T CARII , 1 ,  () 20 1K = T  
1 H :  () T CARI , 1   is significantly different from  ( ) T CARII , 1 ,( ) 20 1K = T  
ii. Testing for buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
0 H :  () T BHARI , 1   is not significantly different from  ( ) T BHARII , 1 ,  () 20 1K = T  




 5. Empirical Results and Analysis 
Pre- and post-reform IPO underpricing   
As shown in Table 2, average underpricing (conventionally measured by the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price of the first trading day) is 
117.48% for the whole sample period 2001-2003 – a high level, although less than 
reported for earlier Chinese IPOs. It is evident that the average AR for the first trading 
day is very similar to the average return for the initial day (the degree of underpricing). 
In addition, both underpricing and AR were substantially reduced after the May 2002 
IPO allocation reform, with an average decrease of 43.3% and 43.42% respectively. 








Underpricing  1.4255 0.9925 1.1748 
First day abnormal return (AR)  1.4275 0.9933 1.1761 
We explain the decrease in underpricing by conjecturing that the post-reform 
allocation method increased the attractiveness of IPO subscription, in particular to 
better-informed investors, thereby increasing overall IPO demand and simultaneously 
decreasing the need for issuers with little information about demand to underprice 
their IPOs to ensure success. It appears that the IPO reform may have increased the 
odds of winning an IPO ‘lottery’ for large investors, thereby encouraging subscription, 
increasing overall IPO demand and leading to a decrease in underpricingii. 
Pre- and post-reform CARs and BHARs   
Figures 4 to 7 show the change in aggregated abnormal return over the event window 
for pre- and post-reform periods. Table 3 summarises t-test and Wilcoxon test 
statistics for the impact of the reform. The two aggregation methods (CARs and 
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BHARs) provide rather different trend lines over the 20 trading day event window – 
that is, daily re-balancing (CARs) and no re-balancing (BHARs) produce different 
cumulative abnormal returns.   
Figure 4.  () T CARI , 1   () 20 1K = T   for Post- IPO Trading Days 1 to 20: 




Figure 5.  () T CARII , 1   () 20 1K = T   for Post-IPO Trading Days 1 to 20: 
Average CAR after the IPO Reform 
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Figure 6.  () T BHARI , 1   () 20 1K = T   for Post-IPO Trading Days 1 to 20: 




Figure 7.  () T BHARII , 1   () 20 1K = T   for Post-IPO Trading Days 1 to 20: 
Average BHAR after the IPO Reform 
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Table 3.  Statistical Significance of the Difference between the Aggregated 





















() T CAR , 1    20 1.4370  0.0062  20 0.9909 0.0021 340.1618*** 5.410*** 
() T BHAR , 1    20 1.4066  0.0089  20 0.9741 0.0108 147.3975***  5.410*** 
Note: *** p<0.001 
These phenomena demonstrate different after-market reactions in the pre- and 
post-reform periods. There are apparent differences in abnormal returns both (i) 
between the methods of aggregation (CAR and BHAR) and (ii) between the pre- and 
post-reform groups within each method of aggregation. In particular, for both methods 
there appears to be greater reduction in post-reform abnormal returns than in 
pre-reform abnormal returns, over the 20-day after-market window. In theory, trading 
by investors on the open market after listing should rapidly move IPO offer prices to 
their market equilibrium, so the greater degree of price adjustment evident in the 
post-reform period may indicate an increase in efficiency. If traders tend to 
overestimate the precision of their information (Daniel et al., 1998) then prices may 
over- or under-react to new information. Before the reform, given the low odds of 
obtaining an allocation, the high initial returns gained by successful subscribers may 
have caused traders to over-estimate the value of IPOs, leading to an accumulating 
(CAR) or relatively (BHAR) strong abnormal performance over the event window. This 
effect could have been magnified by the aggregate behaviour of less well informed 
traders or irrational noise traders (De Long et al., 1991). However, after the reform it 
seems that offer prices were closer to market value and provided weaker signals for 
over-reaction and irrational trading, reflected in the more restrained CAR and the 
clearly falling BHAR. Another possible explanation is that the reform may have improved secondary market 
liquidity, both in general and for newly-listed (IPO) stocks in particular. Tying the odds 
of a successful IPO subscription to tradable shareholdings may have encouraged 
investors to trade in the secondary market and to increase their shareholdings so as 
to become eligible for future IPO subscriptions. New investors may also have been 
encouraged to enter the secondary market for the same reason. Given that successful 
IPOs are ‘good’ stocks, at least in the short term, investors may have been more 
encouraged post-reform to trade these stocks in particular, increasing market liquidity 
and improving market efficiency relative to the pre-reform period.   
Pre- and post-reform changes in beta risk   
The distributions of beta (Figures 8 and 9) during the pre- and port-reform periods are 
slightly different, with the average beta being slightly higher after the reform, at 0.9360, 
although this change is not statistically significant. In any case, the betas were 
estimated from post-event data (because of the lack of historical prices for new issues) 
so that the observed change in beta is in any case hard to interpret. Nonetheless, this 
result is consistent with the view that the reforms may have shortened the average 
post-listing length of time for which newly-listed stocks were particularly subject to 
‘herd’ behaviour and/or investor over-reaction. In the pre-reform period such 
behaviour could have led to both high returns and low sensitivity of the IPO stocks to 
otherwise relevant market signals. Increased market efficiency in the post-reform 
period may have encouraged investors to pay more accurate attention to market 
signals when trading IPO stocks, leading to the observed increase in average beta. 
For the whole sample period the average beta is less than 1, implying that on average 
the IPO stocks are slightly less risky than the market index for A-shares in China. This 
finding is quite different from the results of Balvers et al. (1988) who found that the 
systematic risk of new issues was greater than that of the market index.   
 18Figure 8. Beta Risk of Pre-Reform IPOs (01/2001-05/2002) 
 
Mean (Median) beta of the 88 IPOs is 0.8774 (1.0156). 
Figure 9. Beta Risk of Post-Reform IPOs (06/2002-12/2003) 
 
Mean (Median) beta of the 121 IPOs is 0.9360 (1.0094).
 196. Conclusions 
This paper has reported an event study of the impact of the May 2002 IPO allocation 
reform on the short-run performance (one-month post-listing) of 209 Chinese A-share 
IPOs, with abnormal initial returns computed using CAR and BHAR methods. The IPO 
allocation reform altered the way that odds of winning the IPO ‘lottery’ were 
determined. Prior to the reform the odds of success in the allocation lottery depended 
on the amount of the investor’s subscription bid, while after the reform the odds were 
determined by the size of the investor’s existing holding of tradable shares.   
It is found that from 2001-2003 the average abnormal initial return (underpricing) of 
Chinese A-share IPOs was 117.48%, lower than for earlier Chinese IPOs but still very 
high by international standards. Significant pre- and post-reform differences in 
underpricing and post-listing cumulative abnormal returns (CAR and BHAR) were 
found, suggesting that the reform of the IPO allocation lottery mechanism significantly 
lowered the degree of underpricing and probably improved market efficiency. We 
argue that these results are consistent with the view that the reform encouraged 
greater participation by larger better-informed investors, decreasing the elasticity of 
IPO demand and increasing total IPO demand. Following the Information Cascades 
and Bandwagon hypotheses, which may be particularly relevant to Chinese markets, 
these effect would reduce the need for issuers to under-price their IPOs to ensure 
success. There is also a suggestion (albeit non-significant) that the average sensitivity 
of IPO returns to the market index (beta) increased after the reform, which is 
consistent with an increase in market efficiency. The observed after-market 
post-reform changes may also have arisen from the influence of the reform on 
investors’ post-listing demand for stocks in general and IPO stocks in particular. 
Finally, the post-reform reduction in the degree of IPO underpricing may have 
increased secondary market liquidity, and hence reduced the cumulative abnormal 
returns in the after-market. Further research on the market microstructure of the 
Chinese stock market is suggested, to clarify the impact of IPO regulatory reform on 
IPO uncertainty, market efficiency and investor confidence. 
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 22Notes 
i High equity retention by the state, government control and restricted IPO supply. The 
Chinese government has a large equity holding in state-owned enterprises – shares 
not tradable on the stock market but constituting the major part of all outstanding stock. 
A reduction in government ownership would promote stock market growth but this has 
still to be implemented. Until this problem is resolved the supply of IPOs to the market 
may be seriously limited. For example, although investment banks were introduced to 
the IPO approval process in order to certify IPO quality after the 2001 IPO policy 
change, the aggregate IPO supply remains largely in the control of government. 
Furthermore, because the Chinese stock market is still relatively undeveloped and 
there are limited investment instruments, IPO supply is barely able to meet investment 
demand. Basu and Li (2000) have also argued that bureaucrats possess inside 
information about which companies would be most likely to succeed, so that 
underpricing is used to compensate outsiders and to signal a trustworthy future. 
Two types of tradable shares on SSE/SZSE and segmented A-share and B-share 
markets. A-shares are ordinary shares sold to Chinese citizens and qualifying foreign 
institutions; B-shares are sold to foreign investors. The A-share and B-share markets 
are segmented. According to Chen (1997), the two types of share carry equal voting 
rights and obligations for any given company but the offering and trading prices of 
A-shares are about twice as high as those of B-shares. Poon et al. (1998) attribute 
this to a lack of investment opportunities for domestic investors. A-shares are also 
more underpriced than B-shares. Chen et al. (2000) linked the A-share underpricing 
to firm risk and high government shareholdings and B-share underpricing to seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) and government ownership. In addition, Mok and Hui (1998) 
argue that B-share investors are better informed than A-share investors, due to 
different disclosure requirements and underwriter reputation. Finally, the time lag 
between offering and listing are longer for A-shares than for B-shares. Chen et al. 
(2000) documented an average time lag of 10.71 months for A-shares against 1.46 
months for B-shares. 
 23Allocation methods and changes in government regulation. The share allocation 
method has been changed several times, but broadly in two phases. Before 1996, the 
allocation of IPO shares to investors was made via application forms by computer 
system. After 1996, the allocation was carried out through a lottery mechanism. There 
was an important regulatory reform implemented in May 2002, during the second 
phase, when the mechanism was changed in favour of a lottery allocation based on 
the market value of investors’ tradable shareholdings. After May 2002, investors were 
able to subscribe to new issues only if they already owned tradable shares while the 
amount of the new shares subscription was determined by the quantity of their 
tradable shareholdings – the more the existing shareholding, the higher the probability 
of winning the IPO ‘lottery’. Before the May 2002 policy reform the odds of winning the 
‘lottery’ depended on the money spent on the subscription. There was considerable 
debate on this regulation change in terms of whether it helped to promote the stability 
of the market. 
ii Decreasing market returns in general do not appear to explain the decrease in 
underpricing, because post-reform decreases in market returns were actually smaller 
than pre-reform decreases. 
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